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P&PD 1 SOURCE**Yugoslavia Briefing Materials**

Enclosed is an information package on Yugoslavia. It fleshes out answers to some of the questions you raised at the briefing of Friday, 23 May. On the military side we have prepared for you a synopsis of the Yugoslav armed forces, their size, mission, and links to the Soviets (**The Yugoslav Military At a Glance**, enclosed as the first item).

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This material was prepared by the Southeast European Branch, East European Division, Office of European Analysis. Comments and questions are welcome and should be addressed to [ ] Chief, East European Division, EURA [ ]

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### The Yugoslav Military At a Glance

**Strategy.** Yugoslavia's military strategy, called "All People's Defense," is rooted in the army's partisan experience during World War II and was developed following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The strategy provides for a militarily superior enemy to become bogged down--Afghan style--in a protracted, debilitating struggle. In the event of invasion, the military plans to stall the aggressor for 24-48 hours near the border, allowing the nation's 1 million member Territorial Defense Force (TDF) to mobilize. Ground forces are of paramount importance in this plan, followed by the Air Force and Navy. The TDF plans to retreat into the rugged central mountains and fight a guerrilla war. The Yugoslav government hopes that its relatively big and well-trained force--nearly as large as Hungary's and Bulgaria's combined--backed by the TDF, will deter any would-be aggressors. [REDACTED]

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**The Threat.** The Yugoslavs see the Warsaw Pact as the chief threat. Most of Yugoslavia's state-of-the-art weapons are located at choke points along probable invasion routes from Hungary and Bulgaria to Belgrade. Forces stationed there are fully manned and are at a high state of readiness. In contrast, Yugoslav units along the border of Italy and Austria are manned at lower levels and have older equipment. The border with backward Albania is manned by foot soldiers and some old (World War II vintage) T-34 tanks. In exercises the Yugoslavs have proven capable of fully mobilizing the local TDF forces within 24 hours. [REDACTED]

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**Ground Forces.** The army is 191,000 strong (140,000 conscripts serving 1 year terms) and is divided into 9 active infantry divisions serving in 7 military regions. The army's principal firepower comes from its 800 older T-54/55 tanks and 220 new T-72's. The army is modernizing fairly quickly, and all infantry units along the eastern and northern border--facing Bulgaria and Hungary--will soon be mechanized. The army trains rigorously. Although morale among conscripts is probably low--in part due to the severity of the training--troops would probably fight well if attacked. The size, training, and increasingly modern weaponry of the Yugoslav People's Army also serve a deterrent function--especially in light of Moscow's experience in Afghanistan. [REDACTED]

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**Air Force.** The 37,000-man Air Force, of which 8,000 men are conscripts, is weak. With only 150 unsophisticated subsonic Galeb/Jastrebs (indigenously produced) and 150 aging MIG-21's, the Yugoslavs would quickly lose an air war against a major adversary, leaving their army and economic base exposed to air attack. The Yugoslavs recognize the problem and are moving to produce a high performance fighter (Novi Avion) of their own. Until these fighters come on line--planned for some time in the mid-1990's--the Yugoslavs remain vulnerable. They are considering an upgrade of the MIG-21's or the purchase of 30-40 advanced fighters. They probably view an upgrade as inadequate, yet a major weapons purchase will be heavily influenced by cost and a desire to strike a balance

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between East and West (the Novi Avion will have a Western engine and airframe). **Belgrade realizes that whoever supplies the plane will have some leverage over the Yugoslavs for years to come as sophisticated aircraft require a service contract and training.** [redacted]

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**Navy.** The Navy is the bottom man on the totem pole. With only 13,000 men (6,000 conscripts) the Navy's mission is to deny the enemy access to major ports for a day or two, allowing the TDF to mobilize inland. The Navy places a high priority on mine warfare, with many exercises concentrating on minesweeping and minelaying operations. In addition to 22 minesweepers and 7 minelaying platforms, the Navy has 33 other surface ships and 9 submarines. The Navy would probably be unable to delay a coastal attack by a major power for more than a few hours, although the larger ports could probably be held for a time against a lesser power.

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**TDF.** The TDF has close to one million members. It is a reserve force operating at the local level with local defense responsibilities. It exercises frequently and has large quantities of light weapons stored in depots throughout the country. It would probably fight fairly effectively in small units using hit-and-run tactics. It would be less effective in larger scale actions or in attacking well-defended positions. The TDF's large numbers and expected tenacity--given Yugoslavia's long history of bitterly resisting foreign invaders--probably serve as an effective deterrent.

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**Military Relations with the Soviets.** The Yugoslavs have long had an uneasy relationship with the Soviet Union--dating to Tito's break with the East bloc in 1948. The Soviets have sought to gain greater leverage in Yugoslavia ever since, sometimes through bullying, at other times through patient courting. Moscow has long viewed its historic military relationship as an avenue for expanding influence with Belgrade. The Soviets have been prepared over the years to offer the Yugoslavs major weapon systems on easy terms and have pushed for greater access to Yugoslav facilities and military leaders. For their part, the Yugoslavs have tried to exploit Soviet offers while limiting Soviet access and minimizing reliance on the Kremlin. In the last 10 years, the Yugoslavs have made a great effort to become independent arms producers; presently Yugoslav industries provide the military with 70-80% of its defense needs. The Yugoslavs are struggling at the moment to produce major weapons systems of their own. Following are some highlights of the current Yugoslav-Soviet relationship:

1) **MIG-29.** Defense Minister Branko Mamula recently told our Ambassador that the Yugoslavs were considering the Soviet MIG-29 to serve as a stopgap until the Novi Avion comes on board in the mid-1990's. The Soviets are reportedly offering the MIG-29 on very favorable terms. The Yugoslavs are also looking at the French Mirage 2000. A decision is expected this fall.

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3) **Servicing Hardware.** The Yugoslavs service Soviet surface ships and submarines at the Montenegrin port at Tivat, just south of Cavtat. At any time, there are usually two Soviet Foxtrot subs at Tivat for lengthy overhaul.

4) **Port Call Visits, Meetings.** The Soviets, like the US, are allowed up to four port call visits per year. The terms are usually negotiated 6 weeks in advance and there are restrictions on the numbers and types of vessels allowed in Yugoslav territorial waters. Two Soviet ASW platforms made a visit in mid-April. The Yugoslavs were reportedly miffed because the Soviets would not allow them below deck for a look around. The Yugoslavs are also careful to balance military visits by representatives of the superpowers. Senior Soviet military officials periodically meet with their Yugoslav counterparts, although these meetings are largely symbolic. The last such visit was by Soviet Chief of Staff Akhromeyev last summer. Yugoslav Chief of the General Staff Canadi will probably visit the US in the coming months.

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